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Chidambaram should not stand on false prestige. The opposition is to some of its features, and to the manner in which it has been set up, without adequate consultations. There is no opposition in India to the NCTC concept, which is necessary. His unwise action in arming the NCTC with these powers as part of the IB could prove counterproductive. Or if he felt that it must work under the IB, he could have made it a division of the agency without giving it these powers. If he felt the NCTC must have the powers of search and arrest, he could have made it an independent agency. If it has these powers and adds policing to its functions, it may no longer be able to enjoy this protection. Today, the IB enjoys protection from the Right to Information Act. The IB will be preoccupied with defending its arrests before the courts and against allegations of human rights violations. Secondly, the IB's role as a clandestine intelligence collection organisation may get affected. First, there may be allegations of misuse of the IB for harassing political opponents. Granting these powers to the IB through the NCTC mechanism could have two undesirable consequences. More seriously, the Indian NCTC is to be given powers of arrest and searches as part of its preventive operations. This has obviated the need for fresh legislation and fresh political consultation at the Centre and with the States. The Indian NCTC has been set up by executive notification under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act of 1967. In the U.S., the NCTC is a legal institution set up under Congressional legislation after bipartisan consultations, but it does not have any legal powers to act on its own in matters such as arrest, detention, interrogation, searches etc. In India, it is to be made a wing of the IB and will work under the DIB. NCTC is an independent institution not under the control of any of the existing agencies. But his model of the Indian NCTC differs from the U.S. He, therefore, decided to set up the NCTC after a visit to the U.S. Chidambaram admitted that the responsibility for follow-up-action on the available intelligence was diffused. In a statement to the Lok Sabha after taking over as Home Minister, P. Flow of preventive intelligence and follow-up action on even the limited available intelligence were unsatisfactory. The 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai brought out gaps in the functioning of the MAC. Neither the Vajpayee government nor the Manmohan Singh government revisited the recommendations of the Saxena Task Force in the light of the 9/11 lessons. gave up the CTC after 9/11, the Indian model of the MAC, patterned after the U.S. It was placed under the Director, National Intelligence, who is part of the President's personal staff. The Bush administration, therefore, set up a National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) in 2004 as an independent institution not under the control of any existing agency. brought out serious gaps in the functioning of the CTC of the CIA. Therefore, no legal powers were recommended for the MAC.
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It looked upon the MAC as a clandestine wing of the IB, itself a clandestine intelligence collection organisation. The Vajpayee government set up the CTC, under an executive order, as part of the IB but for reasons not clear to me, it named it the Multi-Agency Centre (MAC) and not the CTC. Since in India, the IB had over-all responsibility for counter-terrorism and liaison with the State police, it suggested that the CTC should be part of the IB and should work under its Director (DIB). Inter alia, the setting-up of a CTC on the U.S. In India, the Vajpayee government set up a Task Force in May 2000 - I was one of the members - for revamping the country's intelligence apparatus. The CTC had officers taken on deputation from different agencies. The CIA had a Counter-Terrorism Centre (CTC) for tasks of co-ordination and follow-up action on the intelligence collected by various agencies. The responsibility for co-ordinating preventive action was, therefore, vested in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which handles external intelligence. Before 9/11 forced a rethink, the United States considered terrorist threats from abroad more serious than home-based threats.